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The United States must remain prepared for war, but not one understood by traditional perceptions of security.
The centuries-old idea of "a struggle between nation-states or their coalitions over the preservation and extension
of national sovereignty" is in danger of becoming irrelevant. Long-standing assumptions about warfighting, which
include definitions of victory and defeat, threat entities, and the battlefield itself, are being challenged. The
adversary, furthermore, will not necessarily be an emerging peer competitor, which we seem so intent on
vanquishing by mastering the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs.[1]
Our most likely adversaries will emerge from a process of human advancement, a cyclical shifting between order
and chaos, which is at least a millennium old.[2] Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, this process has been
one of increasing law and order that led to prosperity for many Western nation-states, their public institutions,
and their peoples. The cycle, which is the topic of this article, now may be shifting away from stability toward
chaos, suggesting that the nation-state may be entering a period in which its usefulness as a concept for
organizing societies will be severely challenged.
The United States has been less affected by this process than most other Western nation-states; we seem to
prosper despite such challenges. However, the breakdown of the family, increased drug use among our children,
the growing specter of gang violence, and other forms of social terrorism suggest that our own institutions are not
immune to a degree of chaos. Ralph Peters, in an earlier Parameters article, stated succinctly that we are
witnessing "a struggle to redefine human meaning."[3] Regardless of the state of the revolution to which he
referred, the struggle he describes is far from ended. If the examples of Western history are any indication, we
may expect increasing chaos during the shift from what has been called the "modern" era to its successor.[4]
Much like a chemical process in a crucible, the deconstruction likely to accompany change can be the process
by which existing forms of social and political organization are burned away and new forms emerge to take their
place. This article examines two periods of similar transition, and analyzes characteristics of contemporary values
and institutions which suggest that the Western world may face a period comparable to previous epochal shifts in
warfare.
Epochal Change
Eras of increasing chaos are not sporadic events. Rather, the insights provided by Fourth Epoch War theory
suggest that these revolutions in political and military affairs represent great transitions in Western civilization
when one energy-based epoch ends and another begins.[5] Distinct forms of social and political organization in
the established social order have tended to be replaced by forms more attuned to new interests and sources of
civilizational energy. One of these transitions, from the classical to the medieval epoch, occurred in varying stages
starting in the last quarter of the 4th century and continuing through the first third of the 8th century. Its successor,
which marked the shift from the medieval to the "modern" epoch, seems to have occurred between the middle of
the 14th century and the middle of the 17th century.
The common and single most significant aspect of this process of human advancement is the emergence of
distinct eras of warfare dominated by mercenaries or warriors unaffiliated with extant governing structures.
During these periods, rulers and their followers lose exclusive right to warmaking.[6] The larger process of
change itself suggests some insights into this dilution of sovereignty.
Advanced technology based on a new energy foundation is one of the principal sources of the change.[7] Old
ideas, upon which the prevailing polity forms were based, are manifested in concepts such as economic theory
and definitions of wealth, military ethics, force structure and doctrine, the legal system and sciences, and class
structure and government. In previous eras of change the established ideas and forms through which these
concepts were expressed proved particularly resistant to change; people failed (or refused) to adapt to the
qualitatively advanced technologies used by those who were prepared to challenge the legitimacy of the
established order with applications of new means of making war. The latter ultimately produced new ethical
considerations and social dilemmas which the old ideas were never meant to moderate or resolve. During the
two periods in question, existing social and political institutions broke down as they became irrelevant to new
demands placed upon them by those who possessed "advanced" means of warmaking.[8]
As existing elites lost control of the instruments of coercion and force, their societies were marked by a gradual
decline of consensus and the rise of inertia within the public sector, patterns that seem evident in some advanced
Western states. The economic sector, in turn, can display a shift from traditional to more technically advanced
forms of production, such as from agriculture to industrial goods to informational products.[9] The process
involves all elements of the affected social group, from a decline in older concepts of morality to a legal system
which becomes increasingly unable to administer justice to the displacement of existing social, political, and
economic elites.
Battlefield dominance was lost in those earlier periods, not because the people and the government were
incapable of continuing to function on the traditional battlefield, but because those challenging the governing
structure, free of the dead hand of the past, redefined the battlefield to their advantage.[10] Instead of adopting
radically new ideas of warfighting based on the means available to those who would challenge their right to rule,
ruling elites tended either to modify older means of warfare or to ignore or proscribe the new ones. So the armor
of knights tended to get heavier to protect against launched weapons until the unhorsed knight became an
immobile and easy prey for the peasant with a stiletto. Nor could the certainty of summary execution if found in
possession of a crossbow intimidate others bent on replacing the existing order. The only thing that might have
preserved some semblance of the old order was an internal challenge to the values on which prevailing politico-
military systems were based. Without such an impulse to modify old ways and adapt to new ones,
"establishment" values were inevitably overthrown by the upstarts.
During the struggle between the old order and that which was destined to become the new, outsiders with no
stake in maintaining the existing social and political order--who would benefit directly from its overthrow--were
doing something altogether different with the capabilities inherent in the new means of war. Unconstrained in their
thinking and behavior by established practices or by the fear of appearing "unsoldierly," these military
entrepreneurs violated the accepted rules of war with impunity. They eventually developed radically new
warfighting concepts that allowed them to use the technically more advanced forms of weaponry against the
weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the old order.
Violation of the rules of war--whether for social, economic, religious, cultural, or other motivation--was
condemned by established authorities as criminal activity. There were two principal reasons for this outcome.
First, if such criminal activity were to spread unchecked, it could eventually challenge the warmaking monopoly
of the prevailing state form. "Private war," war waged by individuals, is outlawed in civil societies because it
tends to undermine the legitimacy of the existing social and political order; to surrender warmaking powers is
tantamount to a degradation of national sovereignty.
Second, such activity, be it classical, medieval, or modern, is indeed criminal as defined by any society. A raiding
party of Germanic tribesmen plundering a frontier Roman province, a mercenary company extracting "fire
money" from a medieval town, a drug cartel engaged in a terror campaign against the citizens of its region or the
agents of a South American government, or the seizure of legitimate businesses by Russian crime syndicates--all
are forms of criminal behavior. Private economic gain, blood feuds, religious motivations, or other apolitical
objectives are the primary motivations for these activities. The new warriors in each epoch tend to personalize
their antagonisms.
History suggests that when internal violence, which can be defined as either criminal activity or "private war,"
rises to a level which directly threatens the people of a state, that state form will likely dissolve unless the anarchy
can be suppressed. Perhaps the most evident example of the contemporary applicability of that proposition is the
decline of the nation-state as a governing form in many parts of West Africa. Robert Kaplan, for one, has argued
that for all practical purposes, it may be extinct in that region.[11] Parts of South America, Asia, and those
territories formerly subjected to Soviet hegemony are also experiencing explosive growths in crime and internal
conflict:
Police in Russia estimate that about 3000 organized crime groups, allied into about 150
confederations, now exist and that half of the country's banks and real estate are mafia-owned. . . .
These groups control not only traditional criminal activities such as drug trafficking, prostitution,
extortion, loan-sharking, black marketing, etc., but also other spheres of influence. For instance,
estimates show that 40,000 state-run and private companies are controlled by the crime syndicates
in Russia.[12]
Martin van Creveld's prophetic statement that "in the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups
whom we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit upon more formal
titles to describe themselves" seems to address this new reality.[13]
Comparable statements could have been made by either a Roman scholar or a medieval clergyman. Many of the
successor states to the Western Roman Empire and Europe's medieval fiefdoms were founded by "military
entrepreneurs" not unlike the leaders of the drug cartels, mafias in uniform, and criminal enterprise armies
emerging today.[14] The overriding national security concern for the West is the possibility that developing
conditions could lead to another test of the staying power of existing institutions. The challenge to legitimacy of
the nation-state will come from armed non-state actors intent on legitimizing forms of behavior that current
societies consider to be criminal or morally corrupt.
Such a scenario has occurred at least twice previously in Western history, first when cavalry-based raiders
destroyed the foot-based legions of Rome, and later when arquebus-using mercenaries slaughtered the equine-
based knighthood of feudal Europe.[15] In each instance new forms of social and political organization followed
the triumph of those armed with new or different forms of military means--the feudal state during the medieval
epoch and the nation-state during the modern epoch.
These earlier state forms, initially ruled by leaders little better than today's mafia bosses or drug kingpins, became
respectable and legitimate political entities when the new forms of social and political organization which they
represented became institutionalized as the dominant social, ethical, religious, and economic patterns. Should
such a process begin in the next few decades, crime-based successors to the failing nation-state would begin to
emerge from among the bands of predators presently bedeviling Western and other nations.[16] As in the past,
they would be founded on mercenary and warrior groups; their successes would lead to some form of follow-on
state and allow them to begin to assume the mantle of respectability. History tends to be written by the victors.
In line with this historical process, a number of scholars point out that war is currently undergoing a
transformation. Instances of declared armed conflict, traditionally defined as a struggle between opposing nation-
states, seem increasingly unlikely. We are witnessing the emergence of a new form of war, repeatedly mistaken
as criminal activity; the new form of warfare can be defined as "a struggle between competing forms of social and
political organization over which the eventual successor to the nation-state will be built."[17]
Lessons Learned
The emergence of new warmaking entities suggests that traditional warfighting assumptions held by our senior
political and military policymakers are no longer necessarily valid. We arguably are witnessing a fundamental shift
in politico-military affairs that could see war increasingly fought over competing social and cultural values rather
than as the continuation or expansion of a nation-state's interests or policies.[18]
The individual who is alienated from the rule of law will provide the basis of the new threat we are facing. The
half-starved and uneducated semi-barbarians--Ralph Peters calls them "the new warrior class"--represent one
image of our future enemy. Others will join the ranks of these warriors for ideological or economic reasons;
indeed, there will be many reasons for the emergence of large groups of such outlaws in the years ahead.[19]
This warrior is now experimenting with warfighting concepts that run counter to US ideas of dominance on the
full-dimensional battlefield, one of which rests on low-tech principles of information warfare that we have
mislabeled as terrorism.[20] When these warfighting concepts merge, as they will eventually, with advanced
technologies now emerging from laboratories and clandestine arms factories, members of the groups will find few
obstacles to seizing the initiative from conventionally recruited, trained, and equipped forces of a given state.[21]
These warriors will organize into new warmaking entities, the smallest of which will be subnational groups such as
armed bands, private armies, and local crime organizations. Others, however, will grow in size to become
transnational mercenary companies or free corporations similar to the drug cartels.[22] The largest of these new
warmaking entities will, if not suppressed, begin someday to fill the political void wherever nation-states have
failed or are in danger of losing their legitimacy.
America remains essentially unchallenged by the rise of the non-state groups; indigenous US terrorists of the
1960s and '70s pale by comparison to Bader-Meinhof, the Japanese Red Army Faction, or Russia's criminal
syndicates. Our contacts with them have occurred primarily in non-Western regions, and are characterized by
peripheral campaigns in Lebanon, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Liberia, and Bosnia. Failed operations in both
Lebanon and Somalia resulted in the deaths of 241 Marines and the massacre of 18 Rangers. Operations
undertaken in other former nation-states have not truly tested US ground forces against these groups: our troops
have been severely constrained to avoid incurring casualties. Conditions necessary for stability in failing states or
in other regions, most recently in the Balkans, continue to elude us whenever we face determined non-state
actors, whatever their motives or forms of resistance to the established state.
Until recently we in the United States had been spared intra-state warfare, but this, too, may be changing. The
bombings of the World Trade Center in New York, the federal building in Oklahoma City, and in Centennial
Park in Atlanta--three domestic incidents--are incomprehensible to many US citizens. The incidents do not seem
to fit our perceptions of politically-based terrorism because our traditional definition of terrorism is obsolete.
Instead of viewing terrorist activity as inherently political, it should be considered from the perspective of what it
inflicts upon a nation's social fabric: warfare directed toward the physical and mental well-being of our people.
[23] It is comparable in its effects to endemic disorganized crime, to which millions of our inner-city citizens are
subjected daily by warring street gangs.[24] Rather than its classification as an unacceptable form of warfare
between nation-states, terrorism can be said to represent war waged by those who--regardless of state affiliation
or the lack of it--adhere to emerging forms of social and political organization that are by definition outside the
law and hence are in competition with the nation-state.[25]
In some parts of the United States, those who can afford it create walled communities, not unlike those of
Renaissance Europe, where they can live safely under the protection of private security forces. There are at
present more than 30,000 walled or gated communities in the United States, with 60,000 projected by 2005.
[26] Other citizens go through each day looking over their shoulders and wondering why it is that basic police
protection is becoming less a public good and more a private commodity available only to the highest bidder.[27]
Another image of the non-state warrior may well be that of outlaws within our own society: the street gangster,
common thug, extremist militiaman, computer hacker, or rent-a-cop with a criminal record. The extent to which
societal conflict could stem from the growing number of gang members alone is staggering. One estimate suggests
that gangs with an aggregate membership of about one million active adherents currently operate within the
United States, primarily, but no longer exclusively, within large urban areas.[28]
Implications
This analysis suggests that as states shift from the Westphalian model to some derivative and perhaps largely
imitative form of organization and governance, we will encounter increasingly chaotic forms of opposition.[29]
The overriding national security concern facing us as a result of this shift will be the requirement to wage war
effectively against the emerging non-state warrior and the new warmaking entities within which he or she will
operate.
This will be an extremely difficult task. Rather than one or two well-defined threats against which to prepare, we
will initially be facing dozens, if not hundreds, of such organizations. The links among these groups and their own
internal command structures will more likely resemble a web-like nodal pattern than a hierarchy. The logic of the
Clausewitzian "center of gravity"--useful in conflict against "symmetrical " adversaries--may prove difficult, if not
impossible, to apply effectively against them.[30] Instead, responses tailored to the often unique vulnerabilities of
each group may be required.[31] And while these entities presently may be most visible and active in the less-
developed regions of the globe, their emergence within our own borders is already underway. Should they
become significant threats to national security through the cumulative effects of their activities, many aspects of
civil-military relations, such as Posse Comitatus, could be reevaluated.[32]
The armed forces, particularly the Army and the Marine Corps, will find their value systems increasingly
challenged by the shift toward chaos.[33] Tensions between received values and derived principles and policies
on the one hand, and on the other pragmatic approaches to countering threats of the kinds described above, can
create ethical conflicts. New missions and many of the advanced warfighting concepts which are emerging from
new technologies may challenge the soldier merely to stay alive in the new conflict environment, to say nothing of
completing the mission.[34] At the same time, their opponents on the more technically advanced battlefield may
have the means and the will to use more advanced technology, unburdened by constraints about employing it in
ways that violate our Western rules of war.[35] The US armed forces reflect the values of society; changes of
the sort suggested will inevitably follow rising citizen indignation and apprehension as outlaw groups discover
their capacity for mayhem.
The ethical dilemma we will face is clear. Someday new warfighting concepts, which include cybermaneuver,
terrorism, virtual (computer-based) attacks, and the purposeful use of nonlethal weaponry to inflict long-term
disabling casualties, will give this enemy a clear battlefield advantage:
If the World Trade Center bombers had packed their van with radiological material along with the
explosives, the radioactive debris and ash scattered by the explosion might well have rendered
New York City's financial district uninhabitable for decades to come.[36]
Such an asymmetrical battlefield advantage would be no different from similar ones achieved by the cavalry-
based raider over the Roman legionnaire and the common mercenary over the medieval knight. Each historical
"criminal" group was able to take qualitatively advanced means, encompass them with new warfighting principles,
and fight its way to the mantle of legitimacy. That accepted rules of war were ignored en route to their success
mattered, if at all, only to historians.[37]
Conclusion
This essay suggests that a form of epochal societal change may be under way, a cycle of human behavior
analogous to--and as difficult to discern and describe against the background clutter of everyday activities--as
the Kondratieff long wave in economics. The dilemma described above obviously embodies considerable
potential for a dangerous trend in US national security strategy and national military policy. Rather than face the
prospect of reengineering significant elements of US social and political institutions to prevent their increasing
obsolescence in the face of challenges from non-state actors, the United States could do as other states have in
the past: hire mercenaries to contend with some of the emerging domestic and foreign threats from non-state
actors.
This concept is based on emerging private security firms that conceivably could combat certain of the developing
forms of war.[38] Such firms would be valued for the economic, operational, and political advantages they
possess over traditional military forces. They would serve under competitive contracts, their members free of
strict rules of engagement (ROE) that could inhibit their operational effectiveness. And there would be little public
outcry when some of their "employees" inevitably became casualties. That the intra-state operations in which they
would be involved are not recognized as war only helps to dampen prospective objections to such a policy.
Hence, conceivably there could be scant opposition to contractors carrying out military operations in distant
regions of the world. Our armed forces then would be committed only to conflicts between nation-states where
vital national interests were seen to be at stake.
Private contractors might indeed improve in the short term the US ability to engage in military activities which it
currently has trouble conducting. Their employment could, however, pose a long-term threat to national security.
Their engagement within the United States to deal with gangs, narcotics smugglers, and other threats to domestic
tranquillity is an entirely different matter than chasing outlaws across the African veldt. At the end of the day, the
ultimate form of government outsourcing--relying on mercenary forces to combat non-state warriors--carries
constitutional implications.
There is, as yet, scant empirical evidence to sustain the idea of an epochal shift in the objectives, means, and
methods of warfare such as described here. What we do seem to have in abundance is increasing numbers of
actual or incipient outlaws for whom existing social, political, and economic institutions are an impediment to the
advancement of their private agendas, emerging technology that can provide them great advantages over
conventional forces, and an almost total lack of scruples as to how the technology could be used. There also
seem to be indications that law enforcement agencies and those whose duty it is to defend the nation "from all
enemies, foreign and domestic" are increasingly unable to deal successfully with the rising potential for
nontraditional forms of violence. Should they fail in their duty, the onus will not be on them. It will, as in centuries
past, rest on those who are so heavily invested in the status quo--protecting profit and privilege--that it prevents
them from shaping the new strategic policies that will enable soldiers and policemen to carry out their sworn
duties.
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